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Established in 1964, the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH is one of  the major German foundations 
associated with a private company. It represents the philanthropic and social endeavors of  Robert 
Bosch (1861–1942) and fulfills his legacy in a contemporary manner. The Robert Bosch Stiftung 
works predominantly in the fields of  International Relations, Health, and Education. The 
EU-Middle East Forum, as well as its predecessors, the International Forum on Strategic Think-
ing (IFST) and the Forum European Foreign and Security Policy, have been realized in close 
cooperation between DGAP and Robert Bosch Stiftung.
The Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, ifa) is an organiza-
tion operating worldwide to promote intercultural exchange and dialogue between civil societies.  
With funds from the German Federal Foreign Office, ifa supports with its zivik Funding Pro-
gramme projects of  German, international, and/or local non-governmental organizations to 
support the transformation of  the affected Arab countries from autocratic models to functioning 
democratic systems reigned by the rule of  law and a constructive conflict culture.
Freie Universität Berlin is one of  nine German universities of  excellence. As an international 
network university, it has established liaison offices abroad in Beijing, Brussels, Cairo, Delhi, 
Moscow, New York, and São Paulo. The Cairo Office of  Freie Universität Berlin at the German 
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) was established in 2010. It aims to increase academic and 
scientific cooperation between Freie Universität Berlin and universities and research centers in 
Egypt and the Middle East. It highlights the university’s outstanding research in many fields 
including Middle Eastern Studies. Furthermore it informs students and scholars from the region 
about possibilities of  funding from German and European institutions. At the same time it is open 
to researchers and students of  Freie Universität and helps them identify suitable partners for 
cooperation in the Middle East.
The American University in Cairo was founded in 1919 by Americans devoted to education and 
community service in the Middle East. Today, AUC is a leading English-language university—an 
essential contributor to the social, political and cultural life of  the Arab world. It also serves as a 
crossroads for the world’s cultures: a vital, vibrant forum for reasoned argument, spirited debate 
and understanding across cultures. AUC is an independent, nonprofit, apolitical, non-sectarian, and 
equal-opportunity institution, fully accredited in Egypt and the United States. AUC enrolls 
approximately 5,500 undergraduate students and 1,300 graduate students in fields as diverse as the 
humanities, social and natural sciences, engineering, journalism, and business. It also hosts 
specialized graduate programs, such as gender and women’s studies, international human rights law, 
migration and refugee studies, and environmental engineering.
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Women in Egypt and Tunisia were at the forefront of  their countries’ revolutions 
condemning the corruption of  their regimes and demanding freedom, justice, 
and democracy. As citizens they were fighting side by side with men encouraging 
others through their presence to join the protests. However, one year after the fall 
of  the countries’ presidents, expectations concerning the improvement of  gender 
equality in both states have been disappointed. The issue of  women’s empower-
ment was/is sidelined in the political debate, and women’s political representa-
tion in the newly elected parliaments and constitutional assemblies/committees 
respectively is very insignificant.
The 15th New Faces Conference conceptualized and organized by the EU—Mid-
dle East Forum at the German Council on Foreign Relations brought together 
17 young professionals from academia and civil society in order to discuss the 
transitions in Egypt and Tunisia with regard to gender equality and women’s 
empowerment. The conference did not aim to offer a tour d’horizon of  deficits in 
gender equality in Egypt and Tunisia in all facets of  society and how to address 
these. It rather sought to pinpoint challenges and necessary action particularly 
during the current political transition, hence the focus on the political realm and 
related social factors such as tradition and culture. Together with senior experts 
participants analyzed the current political and social situation of  women in both 
countries and, taking into account experiences and challenges in Morocco and 
Turkey, discussed lessons learned and future strategies to enhance gender equality 
and political participation of  women in both post-revolutionary countries.
This report outlines a considerable part of  the participants’ contributions and 
discussions during the plenary sessions and working groups. The main points 
raised are clustered around three actors, namely the state, civil society, and the 








2. Major Findings of the Conference
I. Politics and the State
• Women’s political representation in parliament guaranteed by a quota does 
not necessarily mean pushing forward gender equality, as women are chosen 
as numbers rather than according to their abilities or political positions. Nev-
ertheless, a parliamentary female quota and detailed internal women quotas 
for parties and all other political institutions like constitutional assemblies 
or committees are necessary, and incentives should be offered to realize this 
representation and presence.
• Incentives should be given to political parties promoting their female mem-
bers and offering capacity building and skills enhancement trainings.
• Young women face many challenges inside political parties as their voices 
are often not given the same legitimacy among male colleagues. More senior 
women and supportive male colleagues should endorse younger females and 
work on their visibility and acceptance.
• The political rise of  Islamist forces and the hegemony of  Islamic language 
in politics and society are threatening the emancipation process. Secularists’ 
circles should accept the new political reality and start engaging in a con-
structive dialogue with Islamists, objectively challenging their positions and 
policies.
• Newly established political parties can learn much from civil society in terms 
of  reaching out to the grass-root level, gathering people around an idea, and 
organizing them.
• In terms of  enhancing gender equality, law was identified as a decisive tool 
of  the state in order to set a just legal framework recognizing women as 
equal citizens, granting them equal rights, and abolishing any legal discrimi-
nation against them. Hence, the state should play a stronger role by intro-
ducing legislation that secures gender equality.
• Attempts of  reforming the family law in accordance with Sharia, i. e. the 
Islamic feminists’ approach, cannot achieve the basic rights of  women 
related to polygamy, inheritance, and other liberties. Hence reforms of  the 
law within the Sharia boundaries can only be considered a short or midterm 
solution, the long term goal being laws in compliance with international hu-
man rights standards detached from Sharia. Still, agreement on international 
human rights standards in conservative societies is difficult to realize if  
polygamy for example is considered by some as a right while others consider 
this practice a crime.
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• Muslims and Christians should work together to reform the family law as 
both groups suffer from discrimination. This could further decrease sectar-
ian tension.
• A reform of  state institutions and an increase in the number of  “femocrats” 
(feminist bureaucrats) are necessary in order to overcome gender stereotypes 
and patriarchal hegemony within these institutions, and ensure the imple-
mentation of  laws and regulations that lead to women’s empowerment.
• Women working inside security institutions could contribute to the re-estab-
lishment of  a bond between these institutions and civil society by introduc-
ing new means and strategies to solve or avoid conflicts. They could con-
tribute to identifying women’s special security concerns and help to change 
the military approach into a more civil one. Women in the army are a very 
significant symbol regarding women’s empowerment and gender equality as 
they are taking most masculine positions and challenging traditional gender 
roles. Increasing their numbers can positively affect perceptions of  women 
in society.
II. Civil Society
• Women’s empowerment in the legal and public sphere is not necessarily 
followed by their empowerment in the social and private sphere. Traditional 
cultural rule models for men and women do not change as quickly as law 
can be changed.
• Focusing on the role of  civil society is more important than relying on the 
state when it comes to the enhancement of  gender equality. Changing the 
perception of  women’s role in society is a culturally sensitive and long term 
process, which needs to be locally driven, and civil society is an arena where 
every citizen can participate freely. Its activities to realize gender equality are 
indispensable and powerful.
• Nevertheless, civil society and political parties complement each other, as 
the latter are necessary to consolidate and translate societal demands.
• Education was identified as a decisive tool of  the state and civil society to 
bring about a cultural revolution, which ensures gender equality in the pri-
vate sphere.
• Civil society organizations would benefit from further capacity building in 
order to ensure their voices are consistently heard. Capacity building should 
aim to empower organizations to develop their own agenda and to train lo-
cal gender experts to ensure local ownership.
• Rural areas tend to be neglected and are not within the scope of  political 
awareness campaigns of  NGOs and international organizations. The most 
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important needs of  women in rural areas must be identified before imple-
menting a program regarding their empowerment.
• Programs of  civil society organizations should adopt a more integrated ap-
proach and combine gender equality issues, political awareness, and devel-
opment programs, since identifying women’s rights as a special case may 
further marginalize the cause.
• Men must be sensitized to the advantages and profits they will gain through 
the empowerment of  their women, and programs should address men and 
women equally.
• Networks encompassing all different non-state agents should be developed 
in order to avoid the fragmentation of  civil society.
• Strategies used by the Muslim Brotherhood or the Sisters of  the Brother-
hood could be adopted, since these movements have worked successfully 
with the people on the ground without relying on any help from the state.
• Communication channels between rural NGOs and national politicians must 
be created in order to translate successful ground work into national policies.
• Media fail to adapt to the changing role of  women, creating images which 
do not reflect the reality of  society. This results in gender inequality and 
draws a false system of  knowledge that goes against feminist movements’ 
efforts.
• Young female role models in the political as well as the private sphere that 
come from different strata of  society should be portrayed. Well-educated 
and intellectual gender advocates composed of  middle and upper class 
women were active in the past, but unable to reach grass-root women and 
girls due to cultural, social, and generational gaps. Hence the media should 
make use of  modern role models in the streets and portray women’s political 
actions, engagement, and contributions to society.
• Media should start gender sensitive trainings for its employees.
III. The International Community
• In addition to NGOs, there are many important active non-state actors avail-
able, which are not yet recognized by the international community. A more 
anthropological definition of  civil society including tribes for example as 
indigenous civil society is necessary. The definition should be pushed ac-
cording to function rather than the structure of  an actor.
• Slowing down the process of  funding could allow donors a wider time 
frame to evaluate the non-state actor landscape, which will enable them to 
provide reasonable and sustainable funding.
Major Findings of the 
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• In some cases, program agendas of  donors are rigid and not flexible enough 
to allow for demand driven projects by local organizations. This needs to be 
altered.
• In addition to funding projects, international organizations should support 
forums for knowledge and experience sharing in the field of  gender equality.
• International relations and resolutions constitute an additional pressure 
tool on states. For example, the United Nation resolution UNSCR 1325 
on women, peace, and security can serve as a frame of  reference for civil 
society to push forward the development of  a National Action Plan for its 
implementation.
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Participants during the working group session
3. Enhancing Gender Equality through the 
State
3.1 The Case of the Family Law
Tunisia
Although girls and boys might experience equal treatment and chances in their 
families, institutions and society tell them differently. Therefore, law was identi-
fied as a decisive tool of  the state in order to set a just legal framework recogniz-
ing women as equal citizens, granting them equal rights, and abolishing any legal 
discrimination against them. Regarding women’s rights, participants explained 
that Tunisia has already achieved remarkable progress. Its personal status code 
adopted in 1956 was part of  a modernization movement of  former president 
Habib Bourghiba and is considered as the most progressive family law in terms 
of  gender equality in the Arab world granting, for example, the right to abortion 
and introducing an anti-polygamy law. Tunisia was also the first country in the 
region to withdraw all its reservations concerning the international convention 
on the elimination of  all forms of  discrimination against women, CEDAW. A 
number of  these reservations used to limit the equality of  women in their fami-
lies, and their removal has finally recognized women as equal partners in mar-
Enhancing Gender 
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riage granting them, for example, equal rights in divorce as well as in the case 
of  guardianship, adoption of  children, or in passing on their nationality to them. 
Furthermore, Tunisia also adopted the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, which 
allows individuals or groups of  individuals to file complaints with the CEDAW 
Committee in case of  abuse of  women. Therefore, the main challenge identified 
in Tunisia after the revolution and in light of  the dominance of  Islamists in gov-
ernment was to preserve the already gained rights and to push them even further.
Morocco
Other countries in the Arab region have also undergone legal reformation and 
modernization in order to adjust several parts of  their laws to international 
standards. Due to the European influence, international standards have been ap-
plied, especially in the spheres of  commercial and business law. However, family 
law remained within the domain of  Sharia legislation and therefore, continued to 
curtail women’s rights. In the case of  Morocco, the family code, Mudawana, which 
is based on the Sharia, was reformed in 2004. The legal committee worked on 
Islamic texts to be suitable for the current needs of  modern societies and intro-
duced provisions regarding the age of  marriage (it changed from 15 years for 
women to 18), equal parental authority, and equal rights to divorce. Being a step 
towards achieving international standards of  human and women’s rights, the at-
tempt of  reforming the family law in accordance with Sharia could not empower 
the basic rights of  women related to polygamy and inheritance. Even though 
Morocco worked very hard on limiting polygamy, participants stressed that the 
law still allows men to marry more than one woman. Restrictions were imposed 
on the permission to marry another wife, but judges often find excuses to legalize 
polygamy. Another obstacle to gender equality highlighted was the fact that men 
still inherit double of  what women do, because Sharia law considers men to be 
the financial supporters of  their families. Reality, however, has changed drastically 
as women obtain high education degrees and have well positioned jobs enabling 
them to financially support their families as well. A participant explained that af-
ter the Islamist Party of  Justice and Development won the elections in November 
2011 women activists are concerned about the future development of  women’s 
rights in Morocco. The fact that the party had criticized women’s rights before 
the legal amendments in 2004 makes feminist activists wonder how it will apply 
the new family code in the future, especially because the party’s standpoint on 
which rights women should enjoy differs from the perspective of  women activists. 
Taking into account the conservativeness of  Moroccan society, the reform of  
the family law in accordance with the Sharia was considered by many participants 
only as a short or midterm solution. The long term goal, however, was to achieve 
international human rights standards outside Sharia.
Enhancing Gender 
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Egypt
Egypt experienced under the reign of  former president Hosni Mubarak secular 
legislation except in the domain of  family law, which like in the case of  Morocco 
is based on the Sharia. Marriage, for example, is therefore considered a religious 
matter regulated either by Islamic law or as in the case of  the Coptic community 
in Egypt by Coptic law. The latter’s situation was thoroughly analyzed by one 
participant during the conference with the following findings: in terms of  divorce 
regulations, the Coptic community faces severe challenges, which led to a struggle 
for legal reform during and after the uprising. Since 2008, when Pope Shenouda 
III amended the 1938 Coptic family law, the Coptic Church grants divorce only 
in the case of  adultery or change of  religion. In the past, Copts had been able 
to file for divorce for nine reasons instead, but given the threat of  community 
erosion the Church desired to strengthen communal identity and cohesion of  the 
Coptic community, led by the conviction that protecting the family—and limiting 
the reasons for divorce—meant protecting the community. Conversion to Islam 
in order to obtain a divorce through Islamic law, and the fact that it is legally 
forbidden to convert back to Christianity has often led to tensions between the 
Christian and Muslim communities. In May 2011, for example, a Coptic woman 
who had converted to Islam claimed that she was abducted by the Church and 
hidden at a Church as a punishment for converting. The participant stressed 
that this event, which was followed by severe sectarian clashes, also showed how 
women after the revolution functioned as identity markers of  the nation or in this 
case of  the community. Since the 1970s when Sadat’s Islamist-friendly policies 
increased the level of  perceived threat of  community erosion within the Christian 
community, religious identity has become more important than national iden-
tity. This identity is usually negotiated through violence over women’s bodies, as 
similar stories about male Christian converts are uncommon. The other option, 
fabricating an adultery claim, is particularly harmful to women if  they are the 
accused, because in consequence of  the claim they and their children suffer from 
social stigmatization and discrimination. The argument went that it is therefore 
much more likely for women to stay in an unhappy marriage instead of  getting 
divorced. During the Arab Spring, Copts launched protests for legal reform but 
were not heard by the Church, as it considered them to be negative side effects 
of  the revolution in Egypt, and the Egyptian state did not offer any support be-
cause it is reluctant to interfere with the affairs of  religious minorities. Using this 
excuse, the police refused to protect Christian protesters who were harassed by 
thugs during demonstrations in front of  a Cathedral.
It was argued that a reform of  Coptic personal status law could help decrease 
sectarian and inter-community tensions. As an example for a similar response 
Enhancing Gender 
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to the threat of  community erosion, the Syrian case was cited where the Catho-
lic Church had widened the reasons for divorce in 2007. Furthermore, it was 
suggested that Muslims and Christians could work together in order to reform 
their family laws, even if  it may be difficult for Muslims in Egypt to speak about 
Christian rights because it is considered to be destructive for national unity. In 
2010, for example, Jordan drafted a new family law inspiring Christians to realize 
a similar reform in their law system. Another solution was found in expanding 
the role of  the state regarding the family law. It should play a stronger and more 
active role by introducing a unified secular family law regardless of  religious af-
filiation or gender so that citizens enjoy the option of  concluding a civil marriage. 
The statement went that the adoption of  a civil marriage implies though on the 
one hand that the state has to give up its comfortable position of  ignoring the 
challenges faced by a minority, and on the other hand that the Church will lose 
influence and power, i. e. two gross challenges. Another identified challenge in 
Egypt regarding reform of  the family law was the fact that previous related en-
deavors are connected to Susan Mubarak, the former president’s wife. As a result 
of  lobbying and legal activism of  women’s movements, she encouraged in 2000, 
for example, the adoption of  a law enabling women to set conditions on their 
marriage contracts. Despite the fact that this and similar laws boost the status of  
women, it was explained they are labeled “Susan laws” and carry a negative con-
notation in Egyptian society after the uprising.
Limits of Legal Reform
The example of  the marriage contract equally demonstrated the limits of  legal 
reform concerning the actual empowerment of  women. Firstly, it was pointed 
out that only few women in Egypt know about their right to set conditions on 
their marriage contract. This means laws can only pave the way for gender equal-
ity but prove ineffective if  they are not practiced. Secondly, women’s empower-
ment in the legal and public sphere is not necessarily followed by their empower-
ment in the social and private sphere. Even though women enjoy the right to put 
conditions on their marriage contract, they are often confronted with hostility in 
society if  they decide to actually make use of  it. The Moroccan author Fatima 
Mernissi was quoted describing this conflict between public and private sphere 
as schizophrenia women suffer from, i. e. before the law women enjoy equal 
rights and in terms of  statistics can be proud of  their achievements. The quota 
of  female professors in Egyptian universities being 30 percent, for example, is 
considerably high compared to Germany (10 percent). In Tunisia women make 
up to 59% of  university graduates and 40% of  judges. But in the private sphere, 
the consensus was that women are still confronted with traditional cultural role 
models for men and women, which do not change as quickly as laws can, and 
Enhancing Gender 
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that while it is relatively easy to promote women in the public sphere, strategies 
are needed to empower them in the private sphere.
In this context, the question arose whether it is useful to impose laws supporting 
certain values on a society, which itself  does not share those values. Who is sup-
posed to direct the other, law society or society law? While one current of  par-
ticipants supported the idea that discussions are necessary in order to determine 
which values a community wants to be reflected in its laws, the other current 
argued that in order to achieve real change regarding gender equality a progres-
sive state is necessary to introduce new ideas by means of  law.
Turkey was taken as an example for a top-down modernization of  the law 
through its founder Kemal Atatürk. In 1926 Turkey adopted the Swiss Civil Law, 
which led to the banning 
of  polygamy, the intro-
duction of  civil marriage, 
and equal rights for wom-
en regarding inheritance. 
Since the 1930s laws were 
progressively amended in 
favor of  women’s rights 
resulting in the consoli-
dation of  gender equal-
ity in the public, private, 
and economic sphere. 
However, upon assessing 
gender equality in Turkey 
in reality, a distinction 
between urban and rural 
areas as well as social 
classes was seen as para-
mount. Women in urban 
areas tend to be indepen-
dent and well educated, 
whereas traditional ideas 
of  gender roles continue 
to prevail in rural areas, 
exemplifying that a top-
down modernization is 
not sufficient. Hania Sholkami during her talk
Enhancing Gender 
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3.2 Laws regarding Political Representation of Women
Benefits and Limits of Women’s Quotas
Besides the legal promotion of  gender equality regarding the family law, the dis-
cussion also revolved around enhancing women’s representation in the political 
sphere and improving their access to decision-making positions. Despite women’s 
active role during the revolutions and them enjoying the same political rights as 
men do, they are not present in the political sphere, and election results in Tunisia 
and Egypt have been very disappointing in terms of  women candidates being 
elected to parliament and the constitutional assembly/committee respectively. 
While Tunisia’s strategy of  introducing a provision for parity between men and 
women on electoral lists turned out to be not effective and sufficient, Egypt’s 
approach of  declaring only one woman on every electoral list to be compulsory 
proved that women’s political empowerment was not on the country’s political 
agenda in the first place. In Tunisia controversy arose over the introduction of  
the parity law, raising criticism as to the absence of  horizontal parity, i. e. alternat-
ing between men and women as heads of  lists, and concerns were voiced about 
whether it is wise to help politically inexperienced women entering parliament. A 
women’s quota for parliament had existed in Egypt before the uprising but was 
abolished due to its negative connotation, since it was mainly used by the former 
ruling National Democratic Party to increase its power in parliament by appoint-
ing its female party members to the specified seats. Today women activists in 
Egypt do not see their progressive vision of  women’s rights shared or represent-
ed by female members of  the conservative Islamist Freedom and Justice Party, 
who form the majority of  women in parliament.
The example of  Morocco showed that women’s political representation in parlia-
ment does not necessarily mean pushing forward gender equality, as often parties 
abide by the quota regulations but place incompetent and weak women that do 
not serve the cause or chose only those women affiliated with male politicians 
and other powerful figures in society. The newly elected cabinet contains also 
only one female member who was appointed as Minister of  Solidarity, Women, 
Family, and Social Development, the classical post often given to female poli-
ticians, and a participant explained that up until the conference, she had not 
brought up the issue of  gender equality as her priority in the cabinet.
The three country examples highlighted that a comprehensive approach specify-
ing single details is necessary, for example establishing quotas not only in parlia-
ment but also in parties and political institutions (like the constitutional commit-
Enhancing Gender 
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tee in Egypt) in general, and that a system of  incentives for introducing quotas 
on these various political levels need to be created. During the discussion, two 
concepts of  women’s political involvement were evaluated, “politics of  repre-
sentation” versus “politics of  presence,” i. e. is the political representation of  
women necessary to achieve gender equality and enhance women’s rights or is 
their presence and political activism fighting for their rights and pushing forward 
their demands outside of  parliament even more important? An example of  the 
latter mentioned was the million women march in Cairo in December 2011, dem-
onstrating in Tahrir Square to condemn the military’s brutality against women. 
There was agreement that both are necessary and complementary, but that in the 
current situation in Egypt and Tunisia, energies and resources need to be allo-
cated in civil society activism to counterbalance the absence of  agenda defenders 
in parliament. And as women in Egypt for example proved a genuine interest in 
politics with a female voter turnout of  60 percent in the country’s first relatively 
free and fair parliamentary election, the belief  was that as women are politically 
active, they will eventually, in the middle- and long-term, push themselves into 
the political sphere. Another group argued that civil society nevertheless needs 
political parties, and that experiences from other countries around the world have 
shown “the return of  the age of  the dinosaurs,” i. e. the need for powerful politi-
cal parties to consolidate and translate societal demands. This was still counter 
argued by those participants saying that links between political parties are driven 
often by mere power interests, NGOs could create mistrust in the population, 
and NGOs might be discredited. This group thought that in general, feminist 
organizations should study the political and marketing tools of  successful parties 
and organizations and make use of  the same strategies and not necessarily ally 
themselves with them.
Challenges experienced by a Female Candidate in Egypt’s Parliamentary 
Elections
Magy Mahrous, who ran as an independent candidate for the Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party in the constituency of  El-Maadi in Cairo, is one of  the few 
young politically active women who competed as individual candidates in the par-
liamentary elections. She has a lengthy work record in civil society in Egypt and 
the Arab region, and the main reason for her to run for elections was her convic-
tion that Egypt needs a holistic development program since the country has been 
economically, politically, and socially neglected. Her aim was to introduce her ex-
perience gained in the field of  civil society into parliament and serve not only her 
constituency, but the country as a whole. In light of  the new constitution, which 
still has to be drafted, she wanted to give people the option of  supporting liberal 
Enhancing Gender 
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ideas. Being her first time—like it was for many others—to run for elections, she 
had no experience in campaigning and was confronted with various challenges.
During the relatively short campaigning period of  six weeks, the law changed 
several times. The regulation, for example, saying that the mandatory female 
candidate had to be put on the upper half  of  the list was only valid for four days. 
The identification number she had received and which was printed on all her pro-
motion material changed one week prior to the elections and turned out to have 
been changed again on the day of  elections. She financed her campaign, which 
included banners and the distribution of  T-shirts and stickers, by means of  fund-
raising events in El-Maadi. Financially, she was not able to compete with religious 
parties, which had diverse funding sources. With regards to content, she found it 
even harder to compete with rivals who urged voters to vote for Islamic parties 
in order to go to heaven. Besides, explaining the liberal idea and the positions of  
her party without defining them as being non-religious was extremely challenging. 
In general, she emphasized that parties and political actors have to explain their 
self-descriptions to the public more effectively. For example, the public needs 
to understand that “liberal” and “secular” does not mean anti-religious, and that 
“civil rule” is not “liberal rule” but rather “non-military rule.” The greater public 
is confused by these largely unexplained concepts and the sheer overwhelming 
number of  parties. Furthermore, Mahrous’ campaign team observed some ir-
regularities during the campaigning period and the elections, for instance Islamic 
parties not abiding by the electoral silence before the election day or polling 
sheets being smuggled out of  polling stations. To this day, she said, it was unclear 
whether those irregularities will be prosecuted.
In her campaign she did not emphasize gender equality and women’s rights in 
particular, but focused on human rights, education, and environmental issues. 
Acknowledging that the poorest and most marginalized in the Egyptian society 
are women, she supported the idea of  enhancing equal rights, not only women’s 
rights. The fact that she was a female candidate was not a special matter for her, 
but campaigning in a local Ahwa (cafe) for example surrounded only by men 
always contained a hidden or indirect message. The support of  her party, though, 
was disappointing and the lack of  competence frustrating. On the party’s web-
site, for example, Mahrous’ name was listed under the wrong constituency. Her 
requests to have it changed were to no avail, and the mistake was even published 
in the newspapers. Still, she considered it to be a good decision to run for the 
Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the Egyptian Bloc, but according to her, 
self-criticism within the party and pushing for women’s rights and political pres-
ence are necessary in order to be more successful in the future. She finally stated 
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that political parties can learn a lot from civil society in terms of  gathering people 
around an idea and organizing them, and that parties need to ground themselves 
and listen to their constituencies instead of  blindly following an ideology.
3.3 The Role of the Constitution and Controversy over its 
Frame of Reference
Secularism vs. Islamism
The next important step following the parliamentary elections in Tunisia and 
Egypt will be the drafting of  a new constitution. This document will further de-
termine the future of  gender equality in both countries. So far, both constitutions 
have contained articles stating that Islam is the religion of  the state. In the case 
of  Tunisia, all reservations to CEDAW were withdrawn, except one stipulating 
that no legislative action will be taken which conflicts with this specific article. It 
was argued that if  religion continues to be a frame of  reference for the constitu-
tion, then progressive laws regarding gender equality could be in danger due to 
Sharia based arguments against them. The discussion about family law in accor-
dance with Sharia has already demonstrated this dilemma. Resuming the Tunisian 
example, two trends in the Tunisian judicial system were named, the traditional 
trend that maintains discrimination against women on the basis of  this article and 
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the more liberal trend, which believes that this article should be reconciled with 
international standards of  human rights.
The fact that the newly elected governments are led by Islamist parties, which 
consolidates their influence on the constitution drafting process, worries women 
activists in both countries. In Tunisia, only about one fourth of  the representa-
tives that were voted into the constitutional assembly are women. It is noteworthy 
that 42 out of  89 An-Nahda representatives in the assembly are females. In the 
case of  Egypt, women are completely absent from the constitutional committee, 
which additionally weakens their influence on the advancement of  women’s rights. 
One possible solution mentioned in order to avoid any negative impact on gender 
equality through religion was to draft a constitution stipulating a secular state, 
which is not hostile to religion, respects diversity and pluralism, and ensures free-
dom of  religion and freedom of  ideologies as long as the law is respected. But 
finding a basic or shared understanding of  the phrasing or which values it should 
enhance was considered a very challenging undertaking in a conservative society, 
which is divided into secularists and Islamists (and others), i. e. how can one agree 
on international human rights standards if  polygamy for some is considered a 
right but for others a crime?
A first step suggested was to stop talking about Islamists as “the other” and to 
accept the concept of  democracy, acknowledging that people have voted for 
them. Instead of  confronting them as enemies or staying inside secularists’ circles, 
the latter should start engaging in discussions with Islamists in Egypt. Certain 
counterproductive trends within feminist circles used to ignore the needs of  
men, and it was stressed that the same mistake should not be repeated regarding 
Islamist forces, as a dialogue can have a fruitful impact on both sides. In the case 
of  Tunisia, it was explicitly mentioned that communication channels do not only 
exist between secular / Islamist groups and the government, but also between 
secular forces and Islamists, and that these channels are used extensively despite 
all differences. But this dialogue is confined to moderate Islamists, as more radi-
cal or fundamentalist (former social, now) political movements like the Salafis are 
less cooperative and open-minded. Their increasing numbers within the Tunisian 
and Egyptian societies is perceived as a tremendous threat, especially as Salafis 
were frequently involved in violent incidences after the revolution attacking, for 
example, girls who were considered not to be dressed decently. Their presence in 
universities spreading fundamentalist ideas is a recent phenomenon equally men-
tioned and requiring serious attention.
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Islamism vs. Feminism–Islamic Feminism as a Solution?
Another question that came up in light of  the rise of  Islamist forces is how Is-
lamism and feminism can coexist, and how the concept of  secularism that has a 
very negative connotation in Egypt for example can be introduced into a society 
whose majority voted for a religious party. One of  the strategies identified was 
to engage with the religious authorities and establishments in order to introduce 
new, progressive concepts into a conservative society. Islamic feminism was taken 
as an example that tries to break traditional hegemonic discourses by reinterpret-
ing the Quran and empowering women within the religious community. It is ad-
opted and practiced by Muslim women in societies where secular feminism itself  
is discredited as a Western concept. As a heterogeneous discourse taking place 
in Muslim majority countries as well as in countries where Muslims constitute a 
minority, Islamic feminism is divided into a spectrum of  positions ranging from 
conservative to radically liberal. All of  these positions have the common goal of  
enhancing gender equality and women’s rights within an Islamic frame of  refer-
ence. It was explained that for this purpose, Islamic feminists turn to the Quran 
and to some extent to traditions of  the life of  the Prophet Muhammad (Hadith) 
in order to prove that Islam as a religion of  justice propagates gender equality 
(or gender justice in conservative readings). Claiming that not the Quran itself  
but rather traditional interpretations of  it foster gender inequality, Islamic femi-
nists tackle patriarchal readings of  the Quran and influence the male dominated 
sphere of  interpreting religious texts. An example was mentioned to explain 
the differences at either ends in the spectrum. While no liberal Islamic feminist 
would understand “beating” (daraba) in the Quran, Sura 4:34, as excessive beat-
ing, conservative Islamic feminists would understand it as “beating a little bit,” 
and more moderate positions would not interpret it as beating in a physical sense 
but re-interpret it as “showing the way” (showing that the same daraba is used in 
this very sense in other verses of  the Quran). More liberal feminists would put 
the Quranic passage in the context of  its revelation, namely in the 7th century, 
arguing that back then, the Quranic message embodied a radical improvement 
of  women’s conditions, and that this spirit—not the wording of  the passage—is 
important and has to be developed further in accordance with today’s modern 
world. More radically liberal positions would call for a complete rejection of  
the passage because no matter how it is interpreted, the text will stay patriarchal 
propagating a gender hierarchy that contradicts their understanding of  God’s 
justice who created men and women as equal.
The approach of  Islamic feminists was was met by many participants with harsh 
criticism who argued that putting feminism in a religious discourse automati-
cally limits feminism’s goals. Those participants of  the secular-feminist current 
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rejected religion as a framework for feminism, regarding the two as incompat-
ible. Feminism based on Islam—whatever the positioning in the spectrum might 
be—will always have its limitations and reach a ceiling, namely the boundaries of  
Islam (“hudud”). Hence Islamic gender justice but not gender equality is possible. 
Examples for such boundaries brought up in the discussion were homosexuality 
and the desperate situation of  single mothers with children that were not con-
ceived or born during a marriage. Both cases lie outside of  these boundaries and 
can currently not be accepted within a theological framework. The participants 
also complained that Islamic feminism does not take into account the needs or 
lifestyles of  progressive secular single women. Furthermore, Islamic feminism 
was criticized as a merely intellectual discourse that does not try to actively claim 
certain rights and that is exclusively led by English-speaking intellectuals, hence 
detached from the lives of  the majority of  women in Islamic countries.
An attempt to find a synthesis between the two previous positions was reflected 
by those participants who sought to achieve secularism, human rights, and gender 
equality by utilizing Islamic feminism/gender justice as a short- or medium-term 
strategy, especially as Islamic societies sympathize with this approach. In general, 
adopting an Islamist discourse as a strategy to attract listeners and win followers 
is found all over the Arab world since the 90s. Except in Tunisia and Algeria, this 
strategy has been a reaction to the increasing Islamization within Arab societ-
ies. The argument went that if  a religious discourse is a more effective approach 
to reach society than a secular one, why not embrace it for the sake of  the goal? 
They clarified that Islamic feminism can therefore only be considered as a tool in 
order to achieve secular (which was regarded as the ultimate) feminist goals, simi-
lar to law reforms inside Sharia that were also considered as a mid-term strategy 
leading to secular laws. The counterargument here was that this strategy has seri-
ous flaws, as it could lead to a consolidation of  Islamic gender justice but could 
in consequence fail to achieve gender equality. In other words, it could lead to a 
stronger Islamization of  society resulting in an even stronger rejection of  West-
ern human rights feminism and consequently the failure of  the long-term strat-
egy. While many participants rejected Islamic gender justice and defended gender 
equality, one participant from Egypt asked in this context whether the conference 
was “about what we think is right or how to find practical and promising strate-
gies,” and added that given the Islamic character of  Tunisian and Egyptian societ-
ies and representation, the solutions drawn would target a majority of  women 
that might not aspire for more than Islamic gender justice. Challenging the claim 
that the ultimate goal of  development or transition should be secularism, a West-
ern participant stated that modernization has failed everyone, and that it cannot 
be taken for granted that modernized states automatically become secular, as the 
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example of  the USA shows. The statement went that a Western-biased perspec-
tive is not necessarily helpful.
The example of  Muslim women in Germany raised a different issue in this 
regard, namely how Muslim women, who find themselves already in a secular 
environment, take different approaches to emancipate themselves as women but 
also as parts of  society. One group detaches itself  from religion and takes the 
more mainstream path of  working within the “universal” feminist framework, 
and the other regards gender justice as inherent in Islam (i. e. Islamic feminism) 
and interprets the Quran in a new hermeneutic framework. According to the 
contribution, this leads to a fruitful debate and a merger of  a European as well 
as a Muslim identity whose joint empowering potential is underestimated by the 
majority of  society, including secular feminists. The group learned that German 
Muslim women organize 
in small independent 
organizations and um-
brella organizations to 
claim and defend their 
interests in a secular state 
but also to defend inter-
ests of  women in general. 
The channels deployed 
are within civil society 
because the defense of  
interests is only deficiently 
organized by the state 
through the Islam Con-
ference, which is seldom 
supportive of  Islamic 
feminists, and the funding 
of  a National Action Al-
liance of  Muslim Women 
by the German Ministry 
of  Family Affairs. Inside 
the general organizational 
structures of  Muslims 
(mosques, regional / state-
level so-called Shura coun-
cils, national umbrella 
organizations) women A working group session
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also play an increasing role in pushing forward the gender agenda. The example 
of  German Muslim women showed that religious identity can empower women 
to achieve greater equality in other different fields they would otherwise not have 
perpetrated and shows a way to claim equal rights as members of  a religion and 
as a woman. During the discussion, the question was posed as to whether this ap-
proach could also be applied to young girls in Egypt for example who refuse the 
“village Islam” of  their parents and try to be pious and modern and whether this 
approach could overcome the paradigm of  the clash of  civilizations.
Turkey as a Role Model?
Turkey being a secular state with an Islamist government is undoubtedly an 
interesting case. The Turkish participant showcased that the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKP) is a political party with an Islamic frame of  reference, but the 
constitution ensures the secular nature of  the state. As a country with a Muslim 
majority, Turkey set Islamic holidays as public holidays and subsidizes mosques. 
Islamic banking is available but not compulsory, and there is a healthy dialogue 
between religious and secular forces about the country’s future. However, the 
Turkish model of  secularism confronts pious women with severe challenges, 
as state regulations interfere with their religious activities and narrow women’s 
personal freedoms. Women wearing the headscarf  are not allowed to enter the 
political sphere. The law banning headscarves from universities was recently 
defused but is still in force in elementary and high schools. Similar discussions 
about religious symbols in public institutions—in most cases the headscarf—can 
be found in France and Germany. According to the participant, Turkey is work-
ing on these issues, and changing relevant parts of  the constitution is taken into 
consideration in order to abolish discrimination against the headscarf  and allow 
religious women more freedom. This again demonstrated the constant interac-
tion between law and society and its mutual impact. The conclusion was that in 
terms of  gender equality the Turkish constitution can be an inspiring example of  
a women friendly legal text (its application put aside). It ensures gender equal-
ity before the law, considers men and women as equal spouses in marriage, and 
stipulates positive discrimination for women regarding working conditions.
3.4 Fostering Gender Awareness by Means of Education
While the importance of  a strong state in order to ensure gender equality was 
frequently emphasized, the need for a cultural revolution was equally often men-
tioned, which changes the perception of  women and fosters the idea of  gender 
equality within society. There was a consensus that stereotypes and the hegemony 
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of  patriarchal language and gender insensitive social norms need to be overcome, 
as boys/men utilize them to discriminate against women/girls and women/girls 
easily accept them and are consequently weakened. In terms of  change at the so-
cial level, education was seen as a vital tool of  the state that seemed to some even 
more effective and powerful than law reforms. Resuming the Turkish example, 
the participant explained that the national education system had been a decisive 
factor concerning the consolidation of  gender equality and women’s empower-
ment. Starting from the age of  six, girls and boys share the same education in 
the same classrooms. Special lessons are given in order to foster the mentality 
that men and women are equal citizens before the law. The education system, in 
which school is obligatory for eight years, provides the required self-building 
structure for women in order to have a say in the future of  their individual as well 
as professional lives, and female illiteracy (although it continues to be a problem) 
has been constantly decreasing since 1935.
In terms of  educated women, Tunisia is in a different situation than Egypt. It 
has huge female human resources to offer who can assist to establish a stable, 
advanced democracy that preserves and promotes their civil rights, and their 
knowledge and productive activities can significantly contribute to the economic 
development of  the country.
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4. Civil Society—Strategies for Women’s 
Empowerment
Assessing the Role of Civil Society Organizations
If  there is one lesson learned from the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, it is not to 
underestimate the power of  the people. Therefore, it was frequently pointed out 
that focusing on the role of  civil society is more important than relying on the 
state when it comes to the enhancement of  gender equality. Civil society remains 
the main forum for participation for social groups, who have been traditionally 
marginalized at leadership levels, and continues to be the main arena in which 
women can have their voices heard. After the disappointing election results in 
terms of  female representation, civil society provides a platform for women’s 
groups in Egypt and Tunisia to advocate the needs and interests of  women 
outside the state apparatus. The argument went that since changing the percep-
tion of  women’s role in society and ensuring human rights for women and girls 
is a sensitive and long term process, which needs to be locally driven, the role of  
local civil society organizations cannot be understated. In the case of  Egypt, a de-
crease in the number of  NGOs working in the field of  women rights and women 
empowerment with regards to political participation was observed. Many projects 
reemerged only after the uprisings, and some conducted by the National Council 
for Women associated with Susan Mubarak were even stopped. Especially rural 
areas were said to be neglected and not within the scope of  political awareness 
campaigns of  NGOs and international organizations. Besides, it was emphasized 
that the topic of  women’s empowerment is a very sensitive one that is difficult 
to approach in a conservative and religious society like in rural Egypt. Therefore, 
the programs implemented rather focus on health problems of  women or cir-
cumcision. In the course of  the conference, several strategies were developed to 
approach gender equality and women rights issues by means of  programs and 
projects conducted by NGOs or other actors within civil society.
Firstly, programs should adopt a more integrated and holistic approach and 
combine gender equality issues, political awareness, and development programs, 
since identifying women’s rights as a special case may further marginalize the 
integration of  women. Instead of  speaking about “women’s rights” civil society 
activists should use the terms “human rights” or speak about the “right of  educa-
tion” for example. Additionally, participants in those programs should benefit 
economically from their enrollment. Furthermore, programs should address men 
and women equally, since the concept of  gender equality needs to be understood 
and practiced by both sexes, and especially male perceptions of  women’s role in 
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society must be challenged. Moreover, men must be sensitized to the advantages 
and profits they will gain through the empowerment of  their women. Both sexes 
should be trained together and not separated from each other, because in rural 
areas women hardly have the chance to deal with males outside the family.
Identifying the most important needs of  women in rural areas before implement-
ing a program was believed to be essential as it ensures local ownership and the 
program’s success. One participant working in rural areas stated that learning 
how to use a computer and especially the internet, for example, was often desired 
by female participants with children. Due to the lack of  transportation and the 
need to balance work and family, the programs should be located close to the 
participants’ homes. Besides, the programs’ executives should build on the skills 
which female participants naturally possess and exercise without defining them as 
“political” or “economic.” Women do support their families, in some cases with-
out a husband, but their activities are considered as “normal” and are not related 
to women’s empowerment or gender issues. One participant also mentioned that 
strategies used by the Muslim Brotherhood or the Sisters of  the Brotherhood 
could be adopted, since these movements have worked very successfully with the 
people on the ground without relying on any help from the state.
In terms of  political awareness, it was underlined that women should be sensi-
tized to how political participation will impact their lives. Negotiation skills and 
particularly leadership capacities should be cultivated in order to foster female en-
gagement in political parties or the political arena in general. Moreover, networks 
encompassing all different non-state agents, who are working in the field of  
women’s empowerment, should be developed in order to avoid the fragmentation 
of  civil society and nurture cooperation and work towards one goal. The Egyp-
tian Feminist Union was mentioned as an example. It was originally established 
in 1923 and was re-established in October 2011 and includes more than 1000 
women’s organizations across Egypt. Its objective is to elevate Egyptian women 
to run for elections, either with a party or independently. Regional and interna-
tional networking for example between Tunisia and Egypt or states that have 
undergone similar transitions and the exchange of  experiences were believed to 
further strengthen the success of  women’s empowerment and movements.
Apart from conducting programs and projects on a grass-root level, it was under-
lined that civil society should focus on advocating women’s rights in the public 
sphere. Bringing women’s rights and gender equality issues back to the political 
agenda was considered particularly important during the current transitional 
phases, since the deteriorating security situation is often used to sideline women’s 
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or human rights issues in Tunisia and Egypt. For example, it was argued that 
if  the scandalization of  the woman who was dragged and beaten by soldiers in 
December 2011 in Cairo led to a larger-than-usual outcry nationally as well as 
internationally, then stories like this one can be very helpful and should be col-
lected and utilized to create awareness and solidarity in society to help moving 
women’s rights into a national context. Hence, the conclusion was that a short-
term continuous push in the current transitional phase needs to be accompanied 
by a long-term shift of  paradigms in society, education, and politics.
Media’s Contribution to Gender (In-)Equality
The role of  the media to empower women was particularly emphasized dur-
ing the discussions. Not only media’s capacity of  setting the agenda for public 
debates and its influence on public opinion, but also its role in shaping images 
can be used to sensitize or educate society about gender equality issues. There 
was agreement that the media has been performing very poorly in this respect. 
For instance the media coverage of  female candidates during the elections for 
the people’s assembly in Egypt was disappointing, and Mahrous mentioned that 
access to media during her campaign was rather difficult and journalists started to 
be interested in her only after the elections. Participants learned that in Morocco 
media coverage of  women is even counterproductive in terms of  gender equality. 
The role of  women in Morocco has changed in the last 20 years. But the media 
failed to adapt to these changes creating images of  women, which do not reflect 
the reality of  Moroccan society. Despite the fact that women are well educated, 
decision-makers in politics, and economic and financial supporters in households 
and businesses, Moroccan TV dramas associate them with temptation and deg-
radation and represent them as reckless, controlled, submissive, victimized, and/
or uneducated. In newspapers or magazines, men are associated with hard topics 
and are given space to elaborate on their opinions about politics and the econo-
my, whereas women’s voices are linked to soft topics like fashion, cooking, and 
scandals. Constructing categories for each gender, which do not reflect the reality, 
results in gender inequality and establishes a false system of  knowledge that goes 
against the feminist movement’s efforts in Morocco. However, the participant 
further elaborated that the Moroccan Ministry of  Communication acknowledged 
the importance of  gender equality and recently launched a yearly prize for gender 
equality in media encouraging journalists and media industries to take into con-
sideration new strategies of  gender balancing in the images produced in televi-
sion advertisements and series.
To bring about real change, the group believed that there is a dire need for media 
to start gender sensitive trainings for its employees. Additionally, women should 
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be encouraged—through programs and trainings—to change the male domi-
nated media industry from within. Unlike Egyptian women who are very active 
as bloggers writing about their views and experiences, women in Morocco hardly 
use social media as a platform to express themselves. These and other capacities 
could be built or developed through media trainings conducted by NGOs.
An Egyptian participant held the view that media should use its capacities and 
support women’s empowerment for example by portraying female role models 
in the political as well as in the private sphere. She argued that the January 25th 
uprising produced a new wave of  young female role models who took the streets 
protesting and demanding change, justice, dignity, and freedom. These are young 
Egyptian women who see themselves neither as feminists or advocates of  wom-
en’s rights, nor as intellectuals but as “naturally” active and alert, and they were a 
true reflection of  the role of  women in the Egyptian society. In addition to these 
female “revolutionaries,” there were women distributing water, female doctors 
working in the field hospitals, female filmmakers etc. These young women and 
their contributions have to be placed in the spotlight in order to counterweigh 
the marginalization of  women in the political and public sphere and influence 
younger generations to follow their paths. There were complaints that after the 
student movements in the 60s and 70s, when young women organized strikes 
and marches, Egypt experienced a generational gap in terms of  female politically 
engaged role models. The rise of  conservative religious movements and their 
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restrictive vision of  a woman’s role in society contributed to this development 
as well as the media discourse portraying women as victims or holding them 
responsible for being harassed. And well-educated and intellectual gender advo-
cates composed of  middle and upper class women were present, but unable to 
reach grass-root women and girls due to cultural, social, and generational barri-
ers. Finally, it was stressed that female political candidates and their agendas need 
to be better covered in order to raise awareness of  their potential and encourage 
especially other women to vote for them.
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5. The Role of the International Community
5.1 Funding Policies
How can the international community help to advance gender equality in Tu-
nisia and Egypt? As the civil society landscape in Tunisia and Egypt after the 
uprisings is constantly changing, the need for the international community to 
re-assess traditional engagement strategies was underlined. In the past funding 
of  local NGOs has been a decisive tool for supporting gender equality programs, 
although this strategy was seen as entailing several negative side effects. Competi-
tion for funding, for example, led to the fragmentation of  civil society and the 
marginalization of  small NGOs, since large and international organizations enjoy 
a better access to funding networks. In some cases, international institutions even 
have an already set network of  organizations as their intermediaries, ignoring 
other local actors. In addition, there was critique that program agendas were set 
up in order to meet the funder’s agenda instead of  meeting the people’s needs 
on the ground, and in some cases the definitions of  the donors’ central areas of  
intervention were too narrow for local NGOs to be met. Furthermore, it was 
stated that the evaluation of  gender equality projects is very challenging, as the 
impact of  these programs is difficult to measure. As a result, sustainable funding 
depended more on the writing skills of  the person responsible for writing the 
report than on the program itself.
A first step identified towards a reasonable foreign funding policy was to draw a 
detailed mapping of  the non-state actor landscape working in the field of  gender 
equality. While NGOs are an important pillar within civil society, there are many 
more actors available, which are not yet recognized by the international com-
munity. A better understanding of  their functions and interactions could help to 
support organizations that have come up originally rather than in response to do-
nor agendas. Apart from NGOs, women’s movements in Egypt and Tunisia are 
comprised of  various other actors like ad hoc networks mobilizing around specific 
issues. Therefore, the narrow perception of  who is an actor within civil society 
should be widened and a more anthropological definition should be utilized that 
includes for example tribes as indigenous civil society providing different services. 
In general, there was a consensus that the definition of  civil society should be 
pushed according to the function rather than the structure of  an actor in order 
to move away from the middle-class NGOs and to include more diverse and new 
actors. Including informal groups like youth movements, however, was seen as 
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very challenging as international donors tend to focus on so-called “legitimate” 
and registered partners.
Furthermore, capacity development of  civil society should aim to empower 
organizations to develop their own agenda. In the past, women’s organizations 
were often accused of  adopting a western agenda. If  donors continue to require 
non-state actors to implement a particular agenda, women’s organizations could 
feel themselves stuck between demands of  Islamist groups and those of  the 
international community. Capacity development should additionally include the 
empowering of  local gender experts that could advise programming and outreach 
strategies in order to ensure local ownership. Besides, funding was not seen as the 
only useful support, as some grass-root organizations do not yet have the capaci-
ty to absorb funding. The amount of  administration entailed in the donors’ fund-
ing guidelines could further overstrain small organizations and distract them from 
their actual functions. A different kind of  support mentioned was helping to 
build national and international networks and forums for the sharing of  experi-
ences and know-how. The latter has proven to be very helpful. A participant, who 
is a member in the Tunisian League of  Tunisian Women Voters (LET), stated 
that her organization for example is cooperating with an American organization, 
which is also working in the field of  women’s empowerment in the public and the 
political sphere in order to exchange experiences regarding women’s participation 
in elections. LET’s cooperation with the Arab Institute for Human Rights enables 
its staff  to participate in seminars and additional trainings. Two points shared by 
the group were that as civil society in the region has matured in the course of  the 
last years, cooperation with international NGOs should be based on equality and 
not on a student-teacher relationship. The second point was acknowledging that 
it is still challenging for the international community to find suitable means to ap-
proach the MENA region and to decide whether programs should focus on eco-
nomic or environmental development, health issues or gender equality in order 
to offer the best support during the transitional phases. The consensus was that 
slowing down the process of  funding would allow donors a wider time frame to 
evaluate the non-state actor landscape, which will in turn enable them to provide 
reasonable and sustainable funding in the necessary fields.
5.2 Promoting Gender Equality through International Policies, 
Resolutions, and Relations
Another (top-down) strategy of  international institutions regarding the enhance-
ment of  women’s rights and gender equality is the issuing of  international dec-




15th New Faces  
Conference
Group photo
larations or resolutions. Providing a frame of  reference by setting international 
standards for women’s rights encourages member states to push forward gender 
equality by amending their national law in order to comply with these standards. 
CEDAW, the international convention of  the United Nations on the elimination 
of  all forms of  discrimination against women, has already been mentioned. How-
ever, several Arab states accepted CEDAW only with reservations, which ulti-
mately hindered the improvement of  women’s rights in their respective countries. 
During the conference, special attention was given to gender-mainstreaming in 
the security sector and related international resolutions.
Women’s Current Presence in the Tunisian and Egyptian Security Sector
Women in the army are a very powerful symbol regarding women’s empower-
ment and gender equality as they are taking most masculine positions and break-
ing traditional gender roles. A participant from Tunisia explained that women 
there serve in the army and that feminists launched a very powerful photo 
campaign with female soldiers stationed at the border to Libya saying, “We 
protect you, too.” Female police officers are also present in the streets manag-
ing the traffic, and Tunisia has already launched a national action plan for the 
implementation of  resolution 1325 and became a member of  the Center for the 
Democratic Control of  Armed Forces, with which it will cooperate in order to 
integrate gender issues in any reform of  the security sector. In October 2000, the 
Security Council of  the United Nations adopted UNSCR 1325 on women, peace, 
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and security, a resolution underlining the essential role of  women in the preven-
tion of  conflict as well as in post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. In 
the case of  Egypt, it was stated that women are not visible as police officers in 
the streets. Yet, their inclusion is very important, since the police is the most 
present organ of  the security sector in the public sphere interacting with society 
on a daily basis. Besides, there are no female soldiers or officers in the Egyptian 
army, as the military employs women only in the health sector. Due to the recent 
confrontations between the police and military forces and citizens, there was 
agreement that addressing the issue of  reforming the Egyptian security sector 
is very sensitive and that the official side rejects assistance and proposals from 
national and international actors. However, according to the intervention, security 
sector reform seems to be underway since public debates have taken place on 
whether military service should be mandatory for men and women as well as on 
the protection of  women against gender-based violence, and in October 2011 a 
charter of  strict rules for police officers was released obliging them to carry out 
their duty in accordance with democratic and human rights principles.
A great example in terms of  women’s participation in the security sector men-
tioned—a model not only for Arab states, but also for NATO countries—was 
Jordan, where women make up five percent of  the armed forces. They are not 
excluded from any unit, with 25 percent of  them taking up the position of  of-
ficers. No special strategy was needed to increase the number of  women in the 
security sector because a Jordanian princess, by joining the armed forces, encour-
aged women all over the country to follow her example.
UNSCR 1325 and NATO
A participant explained that in 2007 NATO launched a formal policy on the 
implementation of  this resolution in order to strengthen the role of  women in 
the security field. This policy includes mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led 
missions and operations, integrating gender perspectives at all levels of  decision-
making, developing military education and training curriculum related to gender, 
cooperating with international organizations, NGOs and civil society, as well as 
engaging in public diplomacy and supporting national initiatives like National Ac-
tion Plans.
In the NATO countries themselves, the participant stated that gender equality 
and increased female representation in the security field is far from being real-
ized, and that the NATO institution itself  may not be the best example regarding 
gender equality. 40 percent of  the employees working for the civil NATO organ 
are women, but their share in the decision-making positions is only 17 percent. 
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Women’s representation in the armed forces of  its member states ranges between 
3 and 18 percent. Although NATO may not be the most powerful organiza-
tion concerning the enhancement of  gender equality and women’s rights, it can 
promote these issues in its political dialogue and practical cooperation with Egypt 
and Tunisia. Putting gender issues on the agenda of  bilateral meetings and in-
cluding women’s or civil society groups in NATO’s cooperation policy were seen 
as possible strategies in this regard.
There was agreement that gender-mainstreaming within security institutions in 
Egypt and Tunisia will be crucial to the success of  those countries’ transitions. 
Since the military and the police in both countries helped to sustain the power 
of  the authoritarian regimes and resorted to violence against citizens during and 
after the uprisings, mistrust between the security sector and the people represents 
a major challenge. Especially Egypt has witnessed severe clashes between the 
security forces and the people as well as incidents of  gender based violence com-
mitted by security forces. The argument went that women working inside security 
institutions could contribute to the re-establishment of  a bond between these 
institutions and civil society by introducing new means and strategies to solve or 
avoid conflicts. Furthermore, it was stressed that women included in the strate-
gic decision-making level as well as in operations can contribute to identifying 
women’s security concerns as they often differ from men’s. Their impact could 
help to change the military approach into a more civil one.
However, there were different standpoints within the group about the role of  
women in the army. While one current believed women can have a gender sensi-
tive influence on the institution, the other current argued that the institution will 
rather influence women. They elaborated that while women are often the victims 
of  violence, they still can turn into the cruel aggressors, taking as an example 
women’s role in fascist movements or an incident during the reign of  Moham-
med Ali in Egypt. When Mohammed Ali in the 19th century modernized Egypt 
and enabled women to work in the army or in hospitals, female employees were 
forced to conduct virginity tests on other women. Notwithstanding the fact that 
institutions do exert influence on the people working for them, there was agree-
ment that the security field is a male dominated sphere of  power that cannot be 
ignored, and that changing security institutions from within could lead to their 
democratization.
Apart from the role of  NATO, UNSCR 1325 in itself  was seen as an effective 
frame of  reference for civil society in Egypt to push forward the development of  
a National Action Plan for its implementation. Additionally, there was agreement 
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that the National Action Plans of  UN members engaged in the MENA region 
can contribute to women’s empowerment. The Dutch National Action Plan for 
the implementation of  UNSCR 1325, for example, focused on the question of  
how the resolution could be put into action in its partner countries. Instead of  
cooperating with relevant key ministries, the Netherlands decided to cooperate 
with civil society of  the respective countries in order to find suitable and sustain-
able means for the implementation of  UNSCR 1325.
The extent to which international relations can impact the improvement of  gen-
der equality and women’s rights was also demonstrated in the cases of  Turkey and 
Poland. Encouraged to fulfill the European Union’s criteria for a Turkish mem-
bership of  the EU, Turkey introduced gender equality in marriage (the male was 
no longer the family head), deleted reduced sentences for honor killings, widened 
the definition of  sexual assault, and criminalized sexual harassment. In the case 
of  Poland, the EU had been a successful pressure mechanism because condi-
tions for membership and later EU-level regulations were always more progres-
sive than the country’s national law. Transnational feminist networks that jointly 
lobbied on the European level had also been successful and consequently directly 
influenced the situation in Poland.
In general, the international community is expected to set examples or offer role 
models in terms of  democracy, transparency, separation of  powers, independent 
media etc. But many participants stressed that as Western states are far from be-
ing perfect, Egypt and Tunisia can act confidently during the transitional phases 
and decide what kind of  support or international engagement they want to enjoy.
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